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TRANSMISSION OR RESISTANCE: OPINIONS
OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND THE
IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT
WILLIAM N. THOMPSON*
INTRODUCTION
The federal judiciary of the United States has been described
as the "least dangerous branch" of government.' The most impor-
tant consideration giving rise to this description is the fact that the
courts can do very little by themselves. Like the Pope, they have no
divisions. Because federal judges cannot enforce their decisions,
people must voluntarily comply with court mandates. When citi-
zens refuse to comply, governmental officials-Presidents, gover-
nors, attorneys general, prosecuting attorneys, school superintend-
ents or policemen-must enforce them. However, under certain cir-
cumstances, even governmental officials do not choose to enforce
court decisions.
The factors promoting or retarding such compliance, non-
compliance, enforcement and non-enforcement have been the sub-
ject of several recent studies by political scientists and judicial
scholars. 2 Notable has been Stephen Wasby's integration of the re-
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Western Michigan University. The author
wishes to express appreciation to Dorothea Bradford for manuscript preparation.
1. E.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS (1962).
2. Some prominent examples include THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (T.
Becker & M. Feeley eds. 1973); R. JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE (1967); J. PELTA-
SON, FIrry-EIGHT LONELY MEN (1961); Abraham & Benedetti, The State Attorney General: A
Friend of the Court, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 795 (1969); Barth, Perception and Acceptance of
Supreme Court Decisions at the State and Local Level, 17 J. PUB. LAW 308 (1968); Beany &
Beiser, Prayer and Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schempp on the Political Process, 13
J. PUB. LAW 575 (1964); Katz, Patterns of Compliance with the Schempp Decision, 14 J. PUB.
LAW 396 (1965); Miller, On the Need for "Impact Analysis" of Supreme Court Decisions, 53
GEO. L.J. 365 (1965); Murphy, The Problem of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEXAS
L. REV. 939 (1966); Patric, The Impact of a Court Decision: Aftermath of the McCollum Case,
6 J. PUB. LAW 455 (1957); Petrick, The Supreme Court and Authority Acceptance, 21 WEST.
POL. Q. 5 (1968); Sorauf, Zorach v. Clauson: The Impact of a Supreme Court Decision, 53
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 777 (1959); Stumpf, Congressional Response to Supreme Court Rulings:
The Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J. PUB. LAW 376 (1965); Vines, Federal District Judges
and Race Relations Cases in the South, 26 J. POL. 337 (1964); Note, The Impact of the
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sults of these studies in an explicit effort to build toward a theory
of impact.' This is another study of the forces affecting impact.
Specifically, attention here is focused upon the role of southern state
attorneys general in facilitating or resisting federal court policy on
questions of the legal segregation of the races. This study will at-
tempt to test several of the propositions advanced in Wasby's
theory-building endeavors.
The relationship of the state attorney general to the impact of
federal court policy deserves study because the office of attorney
general is peculiarly situated at the middle of several legal forces.
Each state attorney general is the lawyer for the officials of state
government and is charged with defending them when their actions
are challenged on legal grounds. At the same time, he is also the
lawyer for all of the people of the state. Moreover, as an attorney,
especially as the chief attorney in the state, he serves as an officer
of the court.4 When not engaged in litigation, the attorney general
must do what all lawyers do for their clients-advise them of their
rights and obligations under the law. State officials and citizens
alike turn, then, to the attorney general for a delineation of the
existing law.
By being in such a position, the attorney general is well situated
to help or hinder compliance with court decisions. The advisory
opinions of the attorney general offer firm evidence of his willingness
to aid or impede the impact of court decisions. Richard Johnson
writes in The Dynamics of Compliance:
Separate from the formal judicial structure but occupying
a strategic position as message-transmitter are the states'
attorneys general, the chief legal officers of the states. It is
customary for attorneys general when requested, to handle
legal questions of interpretation and application of Su-
preme Court rulings. The opinions rendered. . . are gener-
ally followed as controlling until a court of law holds other-
wise. In quantitative terms, these officials play a more sig-
Supreme Court Section 103 Cases on the Standard of Patentability in the Lower Federal
Courts, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 818 (1967); Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of
Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967).
3. S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES
(1970) [hereinafter cited as WASsv].
4. See In re Lord, 225 Minn. 370, 97 N.W.2d 287 (1959).
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STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
nificant transmission role than does the court system.'
Henry Abraham and Robert Benedetti' concur with Johnson's
assessment. In commenting upon the importance of action by the
state attorney general regarding the school prayer cases,7 they main-
tain:
Whatever the motivation of an attorney general's action,
his policy sets the tone for state response to the decision.
In the vast majority of cases his opinion was requested by
the state commissioner of education who thereafter acted in
full accord with that opinion. State commissioners even
followed the attorney general's lead when he advised action
contrary to the face of the Court's order.8
Abraham and Benedetti hypothesize that the opinions of the
attorney general attempt to strike a balance between federal court
edicts and public opinion in their states.' They believe that political
pressures-notably the expectations of the electorate-influence the
actions of the attorneys general." On the other hand, Samuel Kri-
slov's examination of southern attorneys general leads him to con-
clude that the officials' actions are very much a function of the views
of their constituents and not balanced by considerations of federal
court policy." He writes:
As time went on, those on the fence have generally been
forced to espouse a more anti-desegregation stand. . . . As
the southern attorney general has moved into line with pub-
lic opinion, his office has tended to become a clearing house
for resistance. 2
Krislov finds the reason for this behavior in the fact that the attor-
5. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 63.
6. Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 2.
7. In these cases, the Supreme Court found that prayer and Bible-reading exercises in
public schools were unconstitutional. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(Bible-reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer).
8. Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 2, at 815.
9. Id. at 820.
10. Id.
11. Krislov, Constituency Versus Constitutionalism: The Desegregation Issue and Ten-
sions and Aspirations of Southern Attorneys General, 3 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 75 (1959).
12. Id. at 77-78.
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ney general's reference groups are local and that his career goals are
at the state and not the national level.' 3
These few studies which have focused on the attorney general
and compliance indicate that the attorney general's role is an im-
portant one and that his opinions are a source of that importance.
Yet the studies have not systematically examined any large body of
attorneys general's opinions with the purpose of trying to find the
factors which accompany their use in facilitating or resisting the
implementation of federal court policy. It is to that purpose that
this article is addressed.
ArORNEYS GENERAL'S OPINIONS
Before analyzing the opinions that represent the basic data of
this article, a consideration of the powers and characteristics of
attorneys general's opinions is in order. The attorney general's opin-
ion has qualities of both a lawyer's advice to his client and a judge's
opinion. Yet it is different from each in several ways.
One distinctive feature of the attorney general's opinion is that
it is his personal decision. The opinion represents essentially the
thinking of one man, although the attorney general's legal staff may
aide in its preparation. Hence, the decision-making process is unlike
that of an appellate court since it is not collegial in nature. Moreo-
ver, there is no legitimate way to assure that the process will take
into consideration competing views of the law. There are no adverse
parties which present their cases to the attorney general. Indeed,
there probably is no "case or controversy" involved in the legal sense
of the term. Neither may amicus curiae briefs be filed with the
attorney general. He makes the decision, and he makes the decision
in secret.
A report of the National Association of Attorneys General com-
ments on these facets of the opinion-writing process:
The preparation of an attorney general's opinion places a
great responsibility on the author. Opinions do not involve
an adversary proceeding nor a formal investigation. The
author alone must analyze both sides of the question, re-
search the problem carefully, and reach a conclusion. A
13. Id. at 89-92.
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 3
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Wisconsin study compares an opinion to a law review arti-
cle, in that it is "a well documented piece of legal research
by an author who is familiar with his subject." The study
argues that the opinion procedure is faster, cheaper and
more objective than an adversary proceeding, because the
decision is not influenced by outside pressures or the skill
of advocates. Minnesota's instructions on writing opinions
note that this absence of adversary proceedings "puts a
heavy burden on the writer to see the question in perspec-
tive, to request and evaluate further information when
needed, to discern future problems, and to research thor-
oughly without the prod of potential courtroom embarass-
ment."14
Some states have sought to have opinions exposed to many
legal minds before they are circulated. No attorney general's office,
however, sends its opinions outside of the jurisdiction of the attor-
ney general before they are issued. 5 Some states such as North
Dakota, South Dakota and Wisconsin require that the opinions be
read by every staff member before they are issued. 6 Ohio uses an
"office court" procedure for examining opinions. 7 An assistant as-
signed the task of writing an opinion circulates his draft among
other staff members. The chief assistant then calls all staff members
together to formally discuss the legal issues raised by the opinion.
If a substantial majority of the staff believe the draft to be merito-
rious, it is sent to the attorney general for revision and publication.
Otherwise, it returns to the staff member who wrote it or to another
staff member for rewriting."
14. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, THE OFFICE OF ArORNEY GENERAL
258 (1971) [hereinafter cited as OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL].
15. Id. at 260-62.
16. Id. at 260. See also Christenson, The State Attorney General, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 298,
328.
17. Interview with Robert D. Macklin, Chief Counsel, Ohio Attorney General's Office,
in Columbus, Ohio, Aug. 14, 1970.
18. An excellent commentary on the opinion process in Texas indicates an even more
developed approach there. Dickson, Vital Crucible of the Law: Politics and Procedures of the
Advisory Opinion Function of the Texas Attorney General, 9 HOUSTON L. REv. 495 (1972).
An opinion request is initially sent to the attorney general's opinion committee. The commit-
tee assigns the actual preparation function to that division of the attorney general's office
which deals with the subject matter in question. In addition, all other divisions of the office
are informed of the opinion request. The division preparing the opinion is required to prepare
19741
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Another salient feature of attorneys general's opinions is that
the attorney general himself may initiate the opinion process. While
an attorney general's opinion is usually written after he has been
requested to do so by a public official or, in some jurisdictions, 9 a
private person, attorneys general in the majority of the American
states may render legal opinions on their own initiative .2 This self-
initiated activity contrasts sharply with the normal activity of an
attorney-waiting for clients to bring business his way. The ability
of the attorney general to so push on others his own legal interpreta-
tions may be a violation of judicial as well as professional ethics.2'
However, the laws in most of the states do not prohibit such prac-
tices. 22 While there is no record of how often attorneys general ac-
tually initiate the opinion process themselves, the practice is a
source of great potential influence for the attorney general.
A third important feature of attorneys general's opinions is
two opinions which advance counter arguments. Research on the two opinions is separately
pursued by different assistant attorneys general. The division chief then chooses one opinion
as the preferred opinion and returns both to the opinion committee. The chairman of the
opinion committee then appoints a committee of five assistant attorneys general to review
both opinions. The five are chosen because of their special knowledge and interest in the
subject matter. An attempt is made to staff review committees with persons of conflicting
outlooks. In addition, each member of the attorney general's staff is placed on a review
committee at some time. The review committee holds hearings on the opinions. Persons
outside the office may attend and even file their own briefs, although this part of the proce-
dure is infrequently utilized. However, there is no provision for informing all potentially
interested parties of the review committee meetings and hearings. The opinion committee
next accepts an opinion upon the recommendation of the review committee. The opinion is
sent to the executive assistant attorney general and then to the first assistant and finally to
the attorney general himself. If the attorney general does not accept the opinion, it is returned
to the opinion committee for further review. Otherwise the attorney general signs the opinion
and releases it to the requesting party and to the public. Id. at 501-07.
19. Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, New York and North Dakota. OFcE OF ATrORNEY
GENERAL, supra note 14, at 253-54.
20. The exact number of states where the attorney general's opinions may be rendered
on his own initiative is difficult to determine. A publication of the National Association of
Attorneys General reveals that in over one-half of the states the possibility for such action
exists. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, TABULATION OF QUESTIONAIRE DATA
Table 4.3(a) (1970) [hereinafter cited as QUESTIONAIRE DATA]. However, in many of the
jurisdictions such action would not be taken or would only rarely be taken as a matter of office
policy.
21. Canon 28 of the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association provides:
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit. . . . Stirring
up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 28.
22. See QUESTIONAIRE DATA, supra note 20, at Table 4.3(a).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 3
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their public nature. In contrast to the British practice,2 the opinions
of the attorneys general in the United States are considered public
documents. It is this public nature that gives the opinions a signifi-
cance for transmitting or resisting the impact of federal legal policy.
It is also this public nature of the opinions which brings importance
and prestige to the role of the attorney general.
The prestige factor was recognized as early as 1818 when the
incumbent attorney general of the United States, William Wirt,
determined that all past opinions should be published, as well as all
opinions to be issued in the future. 4 An-increase in the prestige and
usefulness of the office accompanied this decision by Wirt.25 More
recently, a study conducted by the National Association of Attor-
neys General for the purpose of strengthening the role of the attor-
neys general in law enforcement recommended that "formal opin-
ions should be published at least annually" and that copies of the
opinions "should be available to the public when issued. '26
Forty-four states now issue bound volumes of opinions periodi-
cally and all states make opinions available to the public in one
form or another.Y Eighteen states publish digests of opinions as
well.28 Moreover, most states have some procedure for indexing
23. The opinions of the attorney general of the United Kingdom respect the privacy of
the attorney-client relationship. As an advisor to the crown and to the crown agencies, the
attorney general acts in complete confidence with his clients. Opinions are secret matters
between the chief law office and individual government officials. Sir Hartley Shawcross
writes:
That form of advice is sometimes given orally at a meeting of the cabinet, but
sometimes it is given in writing in answer to a formal case that is submitted, and
then it is circulated to the members of government. It is confidential. Sometimes the
opinions are disclosed, but, I am glad to think that this only happens long after the
event and not in the lifetime of the Attorney General who has given the opinion, so
that when it is eventually published he is immune to criticism.
Shawcross, The Office of Attorney-General, 7 PARLAMENTARY AFFAias 380, 383 (1954). This
secrecy is especially valuable in guarding the recipients from opinions that are motivated by
extraneous political pressures. Certainly, the opinion-writing process could not be utilized as
a device for future electoral campaigns by the writer. But the British practice is not followed
in any American jurisdiction.
For another description of the British confidentiality see Jones, The Office of Attorney-
General, 27 CAMBRDGE L. REv. 43, 43-53 (1969).
24. See H. LEAaNED, THE PRFSIDENT'S CABINEr 168-72 (1912).
25. Id. at 168.
26. OFFICE ov ATroNEy GEaAL, supra note 14, at 6.
27. Id. at 265.
28. Id.
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opinions so that they can be found by any official or citizen wishing
to know their contents.2 A few states have even placed opinions on
computer tape for automatic retrieval.30
While the ease of locating opinions varies from state to state,
as a general rule, the opinions are sufficiently available for public
officials and attorneys in a state to be cognizant of their existence.
Such public availability alone gives the attorney general's opinions
great effect. When faced with conflicts, individuals tend to reduce
the realm of the unknown to the known wherever possible. If one
state has not resolved a dispute while others have, the officials of
that state may rely heavily upon the decisions taken by the other
states. A judge will usually follow precedent even if logic might
dictate another course of action. And so also a public official or an
attorney facing an unresolved issue will be likely to follow an attor-
ney general's opinion, even an opinion in another state, merely be-
cause it has the form of law where no other law is likely to exist.
Attorneys general's opinions are likely to be followed for other
reasons as well. A state official possibly subject to litigation would
be disinclined to repudiate the opinion of the lawyer who would be
charged with representing him in court if the likelihood arose. More-
over, even if a state official would be inclined to follow directions
not prescribed by the attorney general, he may be forbidden by law
to do so. In several jurisdictions, there is a binding quality to an
attorney general's opinion. For instance, a Pennsylvania statute
provides: "It shall be the duty of any department . . . having re-
quested and received legal advice from the Department of Justice
to follow the same . . . . I' Pennsylvania courts have taken the
effect of the statute a step further and required that an opinion be
followed even if the opinion was not requested by the official.3 2 The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held in Rasure v. Sparks33 that "it is
the duty of public officers. . . when in doubt as to the construction
of an act of the legislature, to follow, and not disregard, the advice
of the Attorney General . . . . 3 Several other jurisdictions make
29. Id. at 263.
30. Id.
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 192 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
32. See Commonwealth ex rel. Sennett v. Minehart, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 657 (Dauphin
County Ct. 1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Shockley v. Ross, 53 Dauph. 329 (Pa. C.P. 1943).
33. 75 Okla. 181, 183 P. 495 (1919).
34. Id. at 186, 183 P. at 498.
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 3
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opinions binding on all state officials until they are specifically over-
ruled by courts . Additionally, the Michigan Attorney General re-
cently issued an opinion declaring that his opinions were binding
upon local government officials as well as state officials.3 1
Besides the effect of precedent and the binding quality of the
opinions in some states, attorneys general's opinions are likely to be
followed for still another reason. Where a state official acts in ac-
cordance with the advice of the attorney general, legal immunity
may accompany such action. Three states-Alabama, 37 Missis-
sippi38 and Pennsylvania 39-have statutes which specifically give the
recipients of opinions immunity from prosecution when they follow
the opinion's advice. For instance, the Alabama statute states:
The written opinion of the attorney general. . . secured by
an officer or agency legally entitled to secure such opinion
shall protect such officer . . . from liability to either the
state, county, or municipal subdivisions of the state, be-
cause of any official act . . . performed as directed or ad-
vised in such opinion.40
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that immunity is given
even without the specific benefit of a statute. In State ex rel. Smith
v. Leonard,4 the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that a letter of the
attorney general which authorized the state treasurer to make a
settlement against a bank holding state funds absolved the treas-
urer from any liability for the settlement. The letter was held to
afford a "complete defense."42 The court insisted:
If this were not so, state officials could not afford to accept
the advice of the attorney general. They would be com-
pelled to act upon such advice at their own peril.4 3
35. These jurisdictions include Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York and Ohio. See
QUESTIONAIRE DATA, supra note 20, at Table 4.71.
36. The Detroit Free Press, April 23, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
-37. ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 241 (Cum. Supp. 1969).
38. MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-25 (1972).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 192 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
40. ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 241 (Cum. Supp. 1969).
41. 192 Ark. 834, 95 S.W.2d 86 (1936).
42. Id. at 839, 95 S.W.2d at 88.
43. Id. at 840, 95 S.W.2d at 88.
1974]
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The Oregon high court concurred with this logic in State ex rel.
Moltzner v. Mott." It held that the Secretary of State was not liable
for funds he appropriated for prosecution of Blue Sky laws as he was
advised to do by the attorney general. 5 The court said:
If the law were otherwise, few responsible administrative
officers would care to assume the hazards of rendering close
decisions in public affairs. Officers acting in good faith have
a right to rely on the opinion of the attorney general, as he
is the officer designated by law to render such service for
their guidance and protection."
The effect of immunity may extend even beyond formal opin-
ions. In Hastings v. Thurston,7 for example, the Arizona Supreme
Court maintained that an official of the state highway department
was relieved from liability on a contempt-of-court charge when he
demonstrated that he had followed the advice of a member of the
attorney general's staff in refusing to answer questions during the
taking of his deposition." While the question of whether immunity
accompanies compliance with an attorney general's ruling is yet to
be answered in all states, no state has recently held that a state
official following such a ruling would be liable if the ruling were
erroneous.49
A combination of factors, then, makes the attorney general a
powerful decision-maker and a significant link between the federal
courts and the ultimate objects of federal court decisions. The attor-
ney general renders opinions in isolation without having to consider
competing legal viewpoints, and he may himself initiate the
opinion-writing process. Opinions are public documents; their avail-
ability makes their acceptance by state officials very likely. In addi-
tion, their acceptability is greatly increased in those states that
make such opinions binding upon their recipients and grant immun-
ity to persons that follow the opinions. The opinions certainly offer
a source of data which should be considered by political scientists
and judicial scholars interested in the impact of federal court policy.
44. 163 Ore. 631, 97 P.2d 950 (1940).
45. Id. at 635, 97 P.2d at 954.
46. Id.
47. 100 Ariz. 302, 413 P.2d at 767 (1966).
48. Id. at 308, 413 P.2d at 773.
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 3
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COURT POLICY ON SEGREGATION OF THE RACES
The subject of this study is compliance with federal court policy
in the area of segregation of the races. This study does not attempt
to map out the impact of one or two specific cases of the United
States Supreme Court as do most other impact studies. 5° Rather, it
attempts to assess the "transmission" of a general line of federal
court decisions since 1954. This line of cases has consistently broad-
ened the basic policy that public or publicly-sponsored racial bar-
riers are unconstitutional.51 The Brown v. Board of Education" rul-
ing in 1954 was probably the most important Supreme Court deci-
sion of our century. However, the Supreme Court's resolve to desgre-
gate public education was not a singular episode in constitutional
law. The year after the Brown case, the Supreme Court rendered a
second Brown v. Board of Education3 decision in which it declared
that the desegregation process must proceed with "all deliberate
speed."" The first dramatic effort to defy these court rulings came
in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1956 when Governor Orville Faubus
refused to permit public schools to operate on a desegregated basis.
Further Supreme Court action was required to determine that a
governor did not have the authority to so defy the federal courts.55
In the 1960's, southern efforts to circumvent desegregation by plans
such as "freedom of choice"5 or "transfer provisions"5 led to further
49. However, for cases to the contrary see 5 AM. Jua. Attorney General § 6 (1963); 7
C.J.S. Attorney General § 6 (1937).
50. E.g., Beany & Beiser, supra note 2; Katz, supra note 2; Patric, supra note 2; Sorauf,
supra note 2; Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, supra note 2.
51. In cases decided after the period of time studied here, the Supreme Court indicated
that this line of cases may be broken. In 1971, it ruled that the City of Jackson, Mississippi,
was entitled to cease operation of a municipal swimming pool in order to avoid the prospect
of integrating such recreational facilities. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). And,
only recently the Court decided that cross-district busing for purposes of racial balance is not
an acceptable remedy for segregation in most situations. Milliken v. Bradley, 94 S. Ct. 3112
(1974).
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
.54. Id. at 301.
55. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
56. "Freedom of choice" plans permitted school children to enroll in any school within
the school system. In response to demands for integration of its schools, Prince Edward
County, Virginia, closed all public schools in 1959. The next year the county and the state
provided tuition grants to the school children to permit them to enroll in a non-sectarian
school of their choice outside of the county. The Supreme Court declared this circumvention
of its intent unconstitutional. Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218
19741
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adjudication and further resolve by the Supreme Court not to back
off from its general policy of promoting desegregation of the schools.
The desegregation litigation has also affected institutions other
than the schools. Public facilities of all kinds have been desgre-
gated: beaches,58 golf courses,59 parks 0 and public halls.' Moreover,
the courts have upheld federal and state legislative policies requir-
ing equal treatment of the races in certain private facilities." The
courts have also acted to end racial barriers to marriages, 3 sales of
property" and voting rights. 5
The entire thrust of these cases has been to firmly establish the
existence of a federal court policy to end public segregation and
publicly-sponsored segregation. It is the attorneys general's respon-
ses to this policy which are analyzed in this article.
ATTORNEYS GENERAL'S OPINIONS ON SEGREGATION OF THE RACES
The opinions analyzed in this study were reported in the Van-
derbilt University Law School's Race Relations Law Reporter. The
twelve volumes of the Reporter recorded the many legal events in
the desegregation field from 1954 through 1968. Sixty-three opinions
of attorneys general in states which maintained segregated schools
and other public institutions were reported."6 The opinions covered
(1964). New Kent County, Virginia, had also operated a dual system consisting of two segre-
gated schools. When ordered to integrate in 1965, the county instituted a plan that allowed
each pupil to choose between the two schools of the district. While refusing to hold all such
plans unconstitutional, the Supreme Court did decide that "freedom of choice" in itself was
an ineffective tool of desegregation and hence not permissible for New Kent County. Green
v. School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
57. School districts which had operated segregated school systems were forced by Brown
to rezone their districts without reference to race. Some districts responded by allowing
students to request a transfer from their newly-assigned school back to their former segre-
gated school where they would be part of a racial majority again. These "transfer provisions"
were declared unconstitutional in Goss v. Bd. of Education of Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
58. E.g., Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
59. E.g., Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
60. E.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
61. E.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
62. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
63. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
64. E.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
65. E.g., Harper v. Bd. of Education, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Louisiana v. U.S., 380 U.S.
145 (1965); Gomillon v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1961).
66. The states include nine of the eleven states of the old Confederacy plus the border
states of Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri and Oklahoma. No opinions were
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several topics. Twenty-five dealt with aspects of school segregation.
Sixteen were concerned with service in public accommodations; six
with voting rights and elections; three with public meetings; and
three with interracial marriages. Other opinions dealt with topics
such as separate assessment lists for white and black-owned prop-
erty, registration of persons advocating integration and the coopera-
tion of state agencies with the United States Civil Rights Commis-
sion.
Each of the sixty-three opinions was placed into one of two
groups. Twenty-seven (42.9 percent) were considered to be opinions
which facilitated compliance with federal court policy. Thirty-six
(57.1 percent) were deemed to be opinions which aided resistance
to such policy. Twenty-six attorneys general in fifteen southern and
border states issued the sixty-three opinions. Nine of these men
promulgated only facilitative opinions, while another nine wrote
opinions in each category. The remaining eight attorneys general
wrote only resisting opinions.
An opinion was determined to be a facilitating opinion if it
recommended or otherwise approved of action to remove barriers
separating the races."7 Non-facilitating opinions were judged to be
those which ascertained that public barriers promoting segregation
were permissible." Although a measure of subjectivity attended the
reported from Alabama, South Carolina or the border state of West Virginia. Additional
opinions not analyzed included ones which could not be categorized as either facilitating or
resisting federal court policy.
67. Examples of facilitating opinions include those that held as follows: schools may
integrate even though state law specified that they must be segregated (1 RACE REL. L. REP.
277 (1956)); school integration should proceed without the adoption of a formal plan by a
school board (1 RACE REL. L. REP. 1155 (1956)); public meeting segregation laws do not apply
to Parent Teacher Association meetings (2 RACE REL. L. REP. 558 (1957)); truancy laws do
not apply to blacks who refuse to attend segregated schools (7 RACE REL. L. REP. 1304 (1962));
Black teachers must receive equal treatment in integration plans (7 RACE REL. L. REP. 1303
(1962)); racial designations must be removed from candidates' names on elections ballots (1
RACE REL. L. REP. 461 (1956)); a tavern owner cannot refuse to serve blacks (8 RACE REL. L.
REP. 336 (1962)); and interracial marriages are permissible (12 RACE REL. L. REP. 1723 (1967);
12 RACE REL. L. REP. 2302 (1967)).
68. Examples of non-facilitating opinions include those that held as follows: the Brown
decision is ultra vires (1 RACE REL. L. REP. 462 (1956)); an act permitting parents to keep
children out of integrated schools is constitutional (4 RACE REL. L. REP. 812 (1959)); public
funds may be used to pay the tuition of students attending private segregated schools (6 RACE
REL. L. REP. 1227 (1961)); public funds may be expended for the distribution of publications
advocating segregation (2 RACE REL. L. REP. 1049 (1957)); a state training school may con-
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categorization, the issues raised and resolved by the opinions were
in most cases quite clear-cut.
TESTING THE THEORY OF IMPACT
In Stephen Wasby's concern for moving political science toward
a theory of the Supreme Court's impact, he categorized under sev-
eral broad headings some 136 hypotheses he was able to draw from
the existing literature on impact." The hypotheses are not tightly
knit together, nor are they highly structured or conceptually well-
developed. Concerning the state of impact theory, Wasby concluded
that "the holes are sufficiently large that one will be making a
valuable contribution by starting just about anywhere, even if this
seems to reinforce the anarchic nature of the social sciences." 0
However, rather than continuing the attempt to improve upon
the theoretical structures surrounding the study of impact, another
course of action will be taken here. Wasby asked that "someone"
deal with the propositions he discusses.' The data discussed above
will be utilized to test several of the hypotheses he advances. Theo-
ries must be guided by great insights and by minds which can link
widely divergent notions into compact frameworks of explanation.
However, theory must also rest upon a broadened basis of substan-
tive factual knowledge. It is hoped that by testing several hy-
potheses here the body of substantive knowledge regarding impact
can be so broadened.72
The hypotheses tested will be placed into three rather wide
groupings. The first grouping relates to the constituencies of the
attorneys general, the second to their personal characteristics and
the third to the nature of the particular issues involved in the opin-
ions.
tinue to operate on a segregated basis (4 RACE REL. L. REP. 1087 (1959)); teachers can be
dismissed for joining the National Education Association, an organization advocating inte-
gration (6 RACE RsL. L. REP. 1228 (1961)); and meetings of the League of Women Voters must
be segregated (1 RACE REL. L. REP. 1156 (1956)).
69. WASBY, supra note 3, at 243-68.
70. Id. at 266.
71. Id. at 268.
72. Technically this article deals not with impact per se, but rather with the transmis-
sion of court decisions, a major prerequisite for impact.
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Constituencies of the Attorneys General
A. The Population
Wasby hypothesized that the more controversial the subject of
a Supreme Court opinion, the greater the likelihood of some action
aimed against it. 3 Moreover, he advanced the proposition that "if
a Supreme Court decision is seen as bringing about a crisis, reaction
will be more immediate than if it is not so seen."" Additionally, he
proposed that "when local preferences reinforce a judge's personal
views, he is less likely to follow the Supreme Court than when this
is not the case."7 A corollary to this hypothesis would hold the same
for the state attorney general.
From these hypotheses, it might be expected that attorneys
general's opinions regarding court decisions on segregation will be
more likely to be non-complying in those jurisdictions where segre-
gation was most entrenched as a social value. In these jurisdictions
the Brown and subsequent decisions would be most condemned and
most likely to precipitate crises when implemented. In all of the
states studied a modicum of crisis attended the implementation of
court-ordered desegregation. However, the same degree of reaction
was not forthcoming from each state. As indicators both of the level
of crisis which the policies of the Supreme Court might have pro-
duced in the southern states and of the strength of commitment to
traditional values regarding segregation, the percentage of non-
whites in the state (1960) and the percentage of vote for George
Wallace in the 1968 presidential election are utilized. Also examined
is the percentage of the population born within the state.76
Table I-A shows that these indicators are highly related in ex-
pected ways with whether or not the attorneys general's opinions
73. WASBY, supra note 3, at 253.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 261.
76. Factors such as the three utilized here are often used by political scientists to gauge
constituency attitudes and influence over political phenomena. Particularly noteworthy is
V. 0. Key's treatment of party activity in the South as a concomitant of the percentage of
non-whites in southern states. See V.0. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (1949).
Another study utilized the percentage of votes given Strom Thurmond's presidential candi-
dacy in 1948 as an indicator of southern separatism in racial policy. See M. COMMINGS,
CONGRESSMEN AND THE ELEcToRATE (1966). See also W. SHANNON, PARTY CONSTITUTENCY AND
CONGRESSIONAL VOTING (1968).
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facilitated compliance with court policy. Of the fifteen states with
opinions examined here, the five states with the largest Wallace vote
(each giving him over one-third of their vote) produced two facilitat-
ing opinions and fourteen non-facilitating opinions. Attorneys gen-
eral in the next five states (states which gave Wallace from 19 per-
cent to 31 percent of their vote) wrote nine facilitating and twelve
non-facilitating opinions. The attorneys general in the five southern
and border states which least approved of the Wallace candidacy
gave greatest approval to federal court policy. Sixteen of their opin-
ions favored compliance, while ten did not.
In the states with over 20 percent non-white population, Table
I-B indicates that an excess of four-fifths of the opinions resisted
desegregation decisions. The opinions of the attorneys general in
states with a non-white population between 10 and 20 percent were
non-facilitative in 47.6 percent of the cases, whereas only one-third
of the opinions in states with under 10 percent non-white population
were non-facilitative.
A further indication of the strength of local feelings is provided
by the percentage of persons who are natives of the state. Table I-C
demonstrates that attorneys general's opinions were more facilita-
tive of court policy where people born within the state constituted
a smaller percentage of the state's population. Attorneys general in
states with a native-born population of over 80 percent rendered
resisting opinions over 70 percent of the time, while those in states
with a native population of under 65 percent gave resisting opinions
only 45.5 percent of the time. These results suggest that attorneys
general respond to constituent values when they exercise the option
of complying with or resisting federal court directives. Stronger con-
sistuency values supporting segregation apparently make compli-
ance with integration more crisis-like in states with higher propor-
tions of non-white citizenry, Wallace voters and citizens born within
the state boundaries.
[Vol. 9
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TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STATE CITIZENRY AND ATTORNEYS
GENERAL'S OPINIONS ON RACE RELATIONS
Facilitating Non-Facilitating
Opinions Opinions Total
A. 1968 Presidential Vote for
George Wallace
Over 33% (5 States) 2 (12.5%) 14 (87.5%) 16 (100%)
19%-31% (5 States) 9 (42.9%) 12 (57.1%) 21 (100%)
Under 18% (5 States) 16 (61.5%) 10 (38.5%) 26 (100%)
B. 1960 Census
Percent Non-White
Over 30% (2 States) 1 (11.1%) 8 (88.9%) 9 (100%)
20%-30% (4 States) 3 (20.0%) 12 (80.0%) 15 (100%)
10%-20% (5 States) 11 (52.4%) 10 (47.6%) 21 (100%)
Under 10% (4 States) 12 (66.7%) 6 (33.3%) 18 (100%)
C. 1960 Census
Percent Born Instate
Over 80% (5 States) 6 (27.3%) 16 (72.7%) 22 (100%)
65%-80% (6 States) 9 (47.4%) 10 (52.6%) 19 (100%)
Under 65% (4 States) 12 (54.5%) 10 (45.5%) 22 (100%)
TOTAL 27 (42.9%) 36 (57.1%) 63 (100%)
B. Election Considerations
The impact of local values should be expected to affect elected
officials more than non-elected officials. Wasby advanced the hy-
pothesis that "visibility of reaction by government officials is a
function of the time until the next election."" This proposition may
be operationalized by asking how close the attorneys general were
to the electorate. Non-facilitating opinions should be more likely to
come from attorneys general who have been elected to other offices
in the past, who have come to the attorney generalship through
elections and who look forward to future election contests.
77. WASBY, supra note 3, at 263. This hypothesis is also a major theme in studies of
political ambition. See J. SCHLESINGER, AMrnON AND POLrrCS (1966); Thompson, A Theoreti-
cal and Methodological Inquiry into Ambition Theory: Reassessment and Redirection, 1 PoL.
INQuIRY 96 (1973); Thompson, An Analysis of the Legislative Ambitions of State Constitu-
tional Convention Delegates (paper presented to the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, Aug. 30, 1974).
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Figures in Table II-A reveal that attorneys general who held
previous elected offices were less likely to facilitate court decisions
ordering desegregation than were attorneys general who had not
held such offices. Just over 40 percent of the opinions of those with
earlier election experience were facilitative, compared with 47.6 per-
cent of the opinions of the other attorneys general. Unexpected was
the finding in Table 11-B that 51.2 percent of the opinicns of those
elected to the attorney generalship were facilitative, while only 27.3
percent of the opinions of those appointed to the office were facilita-
tive. Since most of the appointments were vacancy appointments
made by governors who led segregation battles, the findings should
not be considered too shocking.
As indicated in Tables II-C and II-D, data on the future election
plans of the opinion writers are more consistent with the hypothesis.
Over one-half (13 of 25) of the opinions of those who afterwards did
not seek another elected term as attorney general were facilitative,
while only 14 of 38 (36.8 percent) opinions by those who did seek
election were facilitative. Similarly 39.3 percent of the opinions of
attorneys general who were gubernatorial aspirants were facilita-
tive, as compared with 45.7 percent of the opinions of less politically
ambitious attorneys general. Moreover, only two opinions which
facilitated compliance were written by successful gubernatorial
aspirants. Six of the non-complying opinions had such authors.
Compliance with federal court policy on desegregation, it appears,
is made at a political cost to the attorney general when such com-
pliance involves a repudiation of traditional state practices.




ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS AND ATTORNEYS GENERAL'S
OPINIONS ON RACE RELATIONS
Facilitating Non-Facilitating
Opinions Opinions Total
A. Did Attorney General Hold
Previous Elective Office?
Yes 17 (40.5%) 25 (59.5%) 42 (100%)
No 10 (47.6%) 11 (52.4%) 21 (100%)
B. Became Attorney General By:
Popular Election 21 (51.2%) 20 (48.8%) 41 (100%)
Appointment (Regular or to
Replace Vacancy) 6 (27.3%) 16 (72.7%) 22 (100%)
C. Number of Times the Attorney
General Sought Reelection
Subsequent to Issuing Opinion
None 13 (52.0%) 12 (48.0%) 25 (100%)
Once 12 (54.5%) 10 (45.5%) 22 (100%)
Twice 2 (15.4%) 11 (84.6%) 13 (100%)
Three Times 0 ( 0.0%) 3 (100%) 3 (100%)
D. Did Attorney General Seek
Governorship After Writing
Opinion?
Yes 11 (39.3%) 17 (60.7%) 28 (100%)
No 16 (45.7%) 19 (54.3%) 35 (100%)
TOTAL 27 (42.9%) 36 (57.1%) 63 (100%)
Personal Characteristics of the Attorneys General
Several personal and political background characteristics of the
authors of the opinions can be examined in an effort to substantiate
or reject hypotheses on impact.
A. Nativity
It would be expected that the attorney general whose back-
ground indicates that he identifies most with his constituents will
be most likely to oppose court policy which challenges values held
by those constituents. For instance, those attorneys general who are
natives of their states should have attitudes closer to their constitu-
ents than those born out-of-state. Places of birth as well as places
of the legal education of the attorneys general were surveyed. The
data in Table III offer some support for the expected relationships.
Of the opinions written by attorneys general born within their state,
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40.7 percent were facilitative, while three of four opinions written
by attorneys general born out-of-state were facilitative. The same
tendency is true for the place of the attorneys general's legal educa-
tion. Those educated instate wrote facilitating opinions 38.3 percent
of the time. In contrast, the opinions of those educated out-of-state
transmitted court policy 56.2 percent of the time.
B. Urban-Rural Background
Urban backgrounds can be expected to generate compliance
more than rural backgrounds for several reasons. Wasby pointed out
that the values of public segregation have been more entrenched in
rural areas of the South than in urban areas because certain private
factors, most notably patterns of residential segregation, have ren-
dered much of the public policy on segregation superfluous in rural
areas.78 Moreover, he hypothesized that non-compliance would be
greater in areas with homogeneous values than in areas of more
heterogeneous values." Since the size of the community certainly
affects the homogeneity of local values, it is expected that attorneys
general born in large cities would be more likely to comply with
court policy than attorneys general from more rural areas.
Population data on the birthplaces of the attorneys general
confirm the expectations. Table II-F indicates that six attorneys
general who were born in cities of over 50,000 population wrote 9
facilitating opinions and 2 non-facilitating opinions. Those seven
who were born in cities of 5,000 to 50,000 wrote ten facilitating and
ten non-facilitating opinions. The thirteen attorneys general born in
communities of under 5,000 population wrote eight facilitating opin-
ions, but twenty-four non-complying opinions.
C. Concern for Court Decisions in Other Areas of the Law
Wasby hypothesized as follows: "Those unhappy at the Court
for earlier decisions will be more likely to attack current ones than
will others." 8° In a similar vein, he proposed that "individuals are
more likely to resist Court decisions when they have done so in the
past than when they have not done so.""'
78. WASBY, supra note 3, at 182-83.
79. Id. at 262.
80. Id. at 258.
81. Id.
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Available data do not permit a direct testing of these hy-
potheses since the totality of past activity of the attorneys general
in relation to federal court policy cannot be determined. However,
it might be inferred from some personal characteristics or experi-
ences that certain attorneys general have had a longer history of
opposition to federal court policy than others.
The Supreme Court in the 1950's and through the 1960's was
especially active in broadening the rights afforded persons accused
of crimes,8" attacking the legality of state action in the field of legis-
lative apportionment," and negating state-sponsored religious ac-
tivities such as school prayers" and direct aid to parochial schools.
It might then be expected that an attorney general whose beliefs
regarding church-state relations were challenged by court actions
and attorneys general who had to defend state actions regarding
prosecution of persons accused of crimes or schemes for legislative
apportionment would be the most resistant to court policy in the
segregation area. Of course, court action in these other areas took
place simultaneously with many of the opinions studied here.
Therefore, the veracity of the hypotheses tested can only be hinted
at by examining the background characteristics of the attorneys
general.
82. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (confessions); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of witnesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right
to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (searches).
83. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
84. E.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
85. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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TABLE III
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTORNEYS GENERAL'S
OPINIONS ON RACE RELATIONS
Facilitating Non-Facilitating
Opinions Opinions Total
A. Was Attorney General Born
Instate?
Yes 24 (40.7%) 35 (59.3%) 59 (100%)
No 3 (75.0%) 1 (25.0%) 4 (100%)
B. Does Attorney General Possess
Bachelor's Degree?
Yes 22 (50.0%) 22 (50.0%) 44 (100%)
No 5 (26.3%) 14 (73.7%) 19 (100%)
C. Does Attorney General Hold
National Law School Degree?
Yes 8 (53.3%) 7 (46.7%) 15 (100%)
Has Degree from Other Law School 15 (41.7%) 21 (58.3%) 36 (100%)
Has No Law Degree 4 (33.3%) 8 (66.7%) 12 (100%)
D. Did Attorney General Attend
Law School Instate?
Yes 18 (38.3%) 29 (61.7%) 47 (100%)
No 9 (56.2%) 7 (43.8%) 16 (100%)
E. Was Attorney General a Member
of a Law Firm?
Yes 16 (51.6%) 15 (48.4%) 31 (100%)
No 11 (34.4%) 21 (65.6%) 32 (100%)
F. Size of Birthplace of Attorney
General
Over 50,000 9 (81.8%) 2 (18.9%) 11 (100%)
5,000 to 50,000 10 (50.0%) 10 (50.0%) 20 (100%)
Under 5,000 8 (25.0%) 24 (75.0%) 32 (100%)
G. Religion
Catholic 3 (30.0%) 7 (70.0%) 10 (100%)
Baptist 1 (11.1%) 8 (88.9%) 9 (100%)
Other Protestant 17 (56.7%) 13 (43.3%) 30 (100%)
Unknown 6 (42.9%) 8 (57.1%) 14 (100%)
TOTAL 27 (42.9%) 36 (57.1%) 63 (100%)
1. Religion
Religious affiliations of twenty-one of the twenty-six attorneys
general who wrote opinions could be determined. Three were Roman
Catholics, four Baptists, four Presbyterians, three Methodists, three
Episcopalians and four belonged to other Protestant denominations.
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As Table III-G indicates, a preponderance of the opinions written
by the Catholic and Baptist attorneys general resisted court policy
on desegregation. Most of the opinions written by the less funda-
mentalist Protestants urged compliance with the federal policy.
Perhaps the school prayer issue has had a greater effect upon
Baptists and other more fundamentalist religious groups than on
groups such as Methodists and Presbyterians. Moreover, constitu-
tional attacks upon various kinds of aid to religious schools have
been levied most directly against Catholic schools. The data, then,
might be offered as speculative evidence for confirmation of the
hypotheses advanced. The numbers are not large enough to justify
firm conclusions.
2. Service as prosecuting attorney or assistant attorney general
Local government attorneys and attorneys for the state govern-
ment, both agency attorneys and assistant attorneys general, have
received the brunt of much United States Supreme Court activity.
These lawyers have had to defend state actions in the law enforce-
ment area, in the area of public religious exercises and in the area
of legislative apportionment. The attacks upon state and local gov-
ernmental practices in the past twenty years have been many. As a
result, attorneys general who had previously served as state or local
government attorneys would be expected to resist desegregation
decisions more than attorneys general without such previous experi-
ence.
Nine of the attorneys general had previous experience as
lawyers for the state government. Table IV-A indicates that 70 per-
cent of their opinions were non-facilitative of federal court policy in
the segregation area. Only 45 percent of the opinions of the seven-
teen other attorneys general were non-compliant opinions.
Table IV-B shows smaller differences regarding experience as
local attorneys. Forty-one percent of the opinions of the seventeen
attorneys general who previously were local government attorneys
were facilitative, compared with 45 percent of the opinions of the
nine attorneys general who had not served in such positions.
As the state attorney general has had to fight many federal
encroachments upon state prerogatives, it could be further surmised
that length of service as attorney general would be related to the
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attorney general's outlook upon federal court policy. Data in Table
IV-C indicate support for the supposition. The data show that facili-
tating opinions were more likely to be written by attorneys general
during their earlier years of service than later in their tenure. The
twenty-seven facilitating opinions were written an average of 3.7
years after the attorney general came to his office. The thirty-six
non-facilitative opinions were written an averhge of four and a half
years after service in office commenced. Thirty-three percent of the
opinions of the more experienced attorneys general were supportive
of the courts, while 50 percent of the opinions of those serving in
their first four years were facilitative.
However, the age of the attorneys general when writing the
opinions was unrelated to the content of the opinions. The average
age of the authors of facilitative opinions was 49.8 years. The non-
facilitative opinions were written by attorneys general with an aver-
age age of 49.6 years.
3. Legislative service
State legislative service seems to encourage compliance. Table
IV-D shows that 50 percent of the opinions written by attorneys
general with such experience were facilitative, compared with 40.4
percent of the opinions of the other attorneys general. While it
might be expected that persons serving in a body which has been
beseiged by adverse court decisions would be skeptical of court
actions, the data do not suggest this. Although the differences
found were not overly large ones, an alternative explanation may
be that legislators were not as obliged to represent and defend
state governmental policies as were state lawyers. In addition,
perhaps service in legislative bodies permits a broader considera-
tion of national policies than does service as a state or local govern-
ment attorney.
D. Judicial Service
Wasby abstracted from the literature on impact a hypothesis
that "judges are more likely to follow Supreme Court opinions than
are other governmental officials.""6 Moreover, he asserted: "Those
seeking higher office in the judicial system will be more likely to
comply with Supreme Court decisions than those in other posi-
86. WASBY, supra note 3, at 260.
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss1/3
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
tions."87 Wasby indicated that these hypotheses "follow from the
role of judges-that they are supposed to follow both precedent and
the rulings of higher courts, particularly the highest court of the
land.""8 He did suggest, however, that local pressures may pull the
judges in directions other than compliance."
To test the propositions advanced, the contents of the opinions
written by attorneys general with judicial experience and by attor-
neys general who sought subsequent seats on the bench were exam-
ined. In both cases, the results indicate, contrary to expectations,
that judicially-oriented attorneys general are more likely to be non-
facilitators than are other attorneys general.
Table IV-E reveals that only one-third of the opinions of attor-
neys general with previous judicial experience were facilitative.
Over 45 percent of the opinions of the others were supportive of
court decisions. Additionally, of the attorneys general who subse-
quently sought seats on the bench, only 26.3 percent of their opin-
ions were supportive compared with 50 percent of the opinions of
those without judicial ambitions. This scant evidence would seem
to lead to the rejection of the hypothesis advanced above. An ex-
planation for this finding might be that all of those seeking court
seats were seeking places on the state bench. To obtain such seats,
these attorneys general were probably more dependent upon state
political forces than were other attorneys general. Hence, it might
be suggested that they placed attachment to their state's values
above any considerations of judicial role identification. Getting
there was more firm in their minds than any thoughts about being
there.
E. Standing in the Legal Profession
The lawyer as well as the judge has a role in upholding "the
law." Lawyers traditionally have been "officers of the court." Ac-
cordingly, Wasby has hypothesized that "lawyers are more likely to
comply with Supreme Court decisions than are non-lawyers."90 Sub-
sequently, he hypothesized that "the higher the degree of profes-
sionalization of a public agency, the less amenable it is to influence




91. Id. at 263.
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from outside with respect to compliance." 9' As a corollary to these
propositions, it could be expected that those attorneys general with
higher standing in the legal profession would be more likely to com-
ply with court policy than attorneys general without high profes-
sional standing.
Possession of bachelor's degrees, graduation from national law
schools and memberships in law firms have been utilized in previous
studies as indicators of prestige and standing in the legal profes-
sion.2 Greater compliance should therefore be expected from attor-
neys general with these attributes.
The data support the expectations, as shown in Tables III-B,
HI-C and III-E. Fifty percent of the opinions written by attorneys
general who held bachelor's degrees were facilitative, compared
with only 26.3 percent of the opinions of other attorneys general.
Facilitative opinions were also more likely to have been written by
attorneys general who graduated from national law schools. Fifteen
opinions were written by attorneys general who had graduated from
one of the fifteen national law schools. 3 Eight of these opinions
supported court policy on desegregation. Fifteen of thirty-six opin-
ions written by other attorneys general with law degrees were facili-
tative. Only four of twelve opinions written by attorneys general
without law degrees supported the courts.
Facilitative opinions were also much more likely to have been
written by attorneys general who had been members of law firms,
offering a further degree of evidence that high professional standing
fosters the facilitation of federal court policy. Over one-half of the
opinions by attorneys general with previous law firm membership
were facilitative, compared with only eleven of the thirty-two opin-
ions written by attorneys general who had not practiced with firms.
92. See R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLMCS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR (1969);
Ladinsky, Careers of Lawyers, Law Practices and Legal Institutions, 27 AM. Socio. REV. 47
(1963); Hourani, Lawyers and Politics (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State Uni-
versity, 1966).
93. For the purposes of the analysis, the fifteen national law schools are considered to
be those which publish law reviews which are cited in all of the state court citators published
by Shepard's Citations, Inc. The schools are California (Berkeley), Chicago, Cornell, Colum-
bia, Duke, Harvard, Michigan, Minnesota, Northwestern, New York University, Pennsyl-
vania, Stanford, Texas, Virginia and Yale.
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F. Attachment to Political Parties
Attachment to political party organizations can be expected to
affect the content of the opinions written by the attorneys general.
It could be expected that strong ties to parties would foster non-
compliance .
Experience in holding three party offices during tenure as attor-
ney general is utilized as an indicator of party attachment. The
three offices are national convention delegate, national committee-
man and state party chairman. The data examined reveal that four-
teen of the attorneys general held one of these positions, and twelve
did not. As indicated in Table IV-G, the fourteen wrote six facilita-
tive opinions and nineteen non-facilitative opinions. The twelve
non-party office holders were much more compliance-oriented.
They wrote twenty-one facilitative opinions and seventeen non-
facilitative opinions, thus confirming the expectations.
94. WASBY, supra note 3, at 189. See also Vines, supra note 2, at 350-51.
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TABLE IV
PERSONAL POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTORNEYS
GENERAL'S OPINIONS ON RACE RELATIONS
Facilitating Non-Facilitating
Opinions Opinions Total
A. Prior Service as State
Attorqey
Yes 9 (30.0%) 21 (70.0%) 30 (100%)
No 18 (55.6%) 15 (44.4%) 33 (100%)
B. Prior Service as a Local
Government Attorney
Yes 17 (41.5%) 24 (58.5%) 41 (100%)
No 10 (45.5%) 12 (54.5%) 22 (100%)
C. Opinion Written Before Fourth
Year as Attorney General 18 (50.0%) 18 (50.0%) 36 (100%)
Opinion Written In or After
Fourth Year 9 (33.3%) 18 (66.7%) 27 (100%)
D. Prior Service as Legislator
Yes 8 (50.0%) 8 (50.0%) 16 (100%)
No 19 (40.4%) 28 (59.6%) 47 (100%)
E. Prior Service as Judge
Yes 4 (33.3%) 8 (66.7%) 12 (100%)
No 23 (45.1%) 28 (54.9%) 51 (100%)
F. Sought Future Service
Yes 5 (26.3%) 14 (73.7%) 19 (100%)
No 22 (50.0%) 22 (50.0%) 44 (100%)
G. Party Offices: Was Attorney
General National Delegate,
Committeeman or State Party
Chairman
Yes 6 (24.0%) 19 (76.0%) 25 (100%)
No 21 (55.3%) 17 (44.7%) 38 (100%)
TOTAL 27 (42.9%) 36 (57.1%) 63 (100%)
Nature of the Issues
This study can be distinguished from many other impact stud-
ies because it considers the public officials' responses to a general
federal court policy rather than responses just to one or two specific
court decisions. By examining sixty-three attorneys general's opin-
ions as a group, emphasis is placed on the similarity of the opinions.
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All the opinions have been concerned with one form or another of
public or publicly-endorsed segregation of the races.
This last section will address itself to differences among the
issues raised in the opinions. Existing studies of impact have sug-
gested that the nature of an issue can affect whether or not there
will be compliance with federal court policy. Wasby, for example,
was led to hypothesize that "non-compliance will be greater when
there is an economic component to a decision than when there is
not. "" The amount of government involvement in the issue has also
been pointed to as a factor affecting compliance. A hypothesis was
advanced that "non-compliance will be greater when patterns of
activity by bureaucracies must change than where bureaucracies
are less involved."" Additionally, it was suggested that "units of
government are less likely to comply with court rulings than are
individuals.""
A corollary concerning the opinions of attorneys general might
be derived from the substantive message of these latter two hy-
potheses. It might be expected that attorneys general will be more
likely to facilitate federal court policy in areas of law involving
individual citizens than they will where that policy affects govern-
mental units. The attorney general's commitment to defend the
values and practices regarding segregation in his state will be great-
est, if he feels any commitment at all, where the practices are those
of governmental units. This is because he is charged with the duty
of defending these units in actual litigation when their actions are
constitutionally challenged, while he has no such obligation to de-
fend private citizens for their actions.
The corollary is well supported by the data. Thirty-nine of the
opinions related to practices of governmental units. Of these, four-
teen (35.9 percent) were facilitative, while twenty-five (64.1 per-
cent) were not. On the other hand, thirteen (54.2 percent) of the
twenty-four opinions involving actions of private citizens were facil-
itative. Table V indicates the types of opinions and their disposi-
tion.
95. WnsBy, supra note 3, at 247.
96. Id. at 257.
97. Id. at 259.
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TABLE V






School Segregation 10 15 25
Voting Rights 1 5 6
Welfare and Employment 0 4 4
Intergovernmental Cooperation 1 1 2
Property Assessment 1 0 1
Registration of Integrationists 1 0 1
TOTAL 14 (35.9%) 25 (64.1%) 39 (100%)
OPINIONS AFFECTING PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS
Public Accommodations 7 9 16
Public Meetings 1 2 3
Miscegenation 3 0 3
Housing 2 0 2
TOTAL 13 (54.2%) 11 (45.8%) 24 (100%)
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to reveal conditions which
are associated with the facilitation or resistance of federal court
policy by state attorneys general. It is hoped that the conditions
identified will add to the substantive knowledge of impact. The
associations that were found in an examination of attorneys gen-
eral's opinions on questions of the segregation of the races can be
placed into three different categories: those involving the consti-
tuencies of the attorneys general, those involving the characteristics
of the attorneys general and those involving the nature of the partic-
ular issues transmitted. It was found that facilitation or resistance
of court decisions was associated with the attributes of the consti-
tuencies of the attorneys general. Personal characteristics and expe-
riences of the attorneys general were also influential in determining
whether the opinions would aid or impede court-ordered desegrega-
tion. Some of the associations between the personal characteristics
of the attorneys general and the facilitating or resisting content of
their opinions support the hypothesis that officials "unhappy at the
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Court for earlier decisions will be more likely to attack current ones
than will others. ' 98
In contrast, a hypothesis suggesting that judicial service fosters
facilitative efforts by officials was not supported. Both attorneys
general with prior service as judges and attorneys general who held
subsequent judgeships resisted the federal court policy of desegrega-
tion more than their counterparts. However, high standing in the
legal profession was related to the facilitation of court policy.
Service to a political party-in terms of holding a party office dur-
ing tenure as attorney general-was highly associated with the
resistance of federal court policy. An examination of the types of
issues raised in attorneys general opinions revealed that opinions
affecting the powers and activities of governmental units were more
likely to foster resistance of court policy than were opinions which
affected only the activities of private citizens.9
Before a theory of impact can stand in political science as a full-
fledged scheme for explaining the execution of court-directed public
policy, many well-defined concepts must be drawn together into a
body of tightly knit hypotheses. It is hoped that the information
revealed in this article can be of use to those who will further em-
bark upon that difficult task.
98. Id. at 258.
99. The data reported in this study must be regarded as data which can only suggest
or fail to suggest the validity of the hypothesis advanced. The number of cases (63) examined
does not permit definitive conclusions regarding the absolute validity or the rejection of the
propositions. The data are expressed with percentages only. No indicators of statistical signif-
icance are used. This omission is made for several reasons. First, where cell frequencies are
very small, the indicators of significance are not accurate measures. Second, where the fre-
quencies are larger, the indicators of significance could be deceptive. They could easily be
misconstrued to mean that the relationships demonstrated were definitive indications of the
validity of the propositions advanced. Third, and most important, given the nature of the
cases examined, tests of significance might not be properly applied. The 63 cases do not in
any sense represent a random sample of another universe. It cannot be inferred from the
relationships shown here that these relationships exist in a broader reality of attorneys gen-
eral's race relations opinions. Rather, the study covers the universe-all opinions on race
relations deemed important enough to receive attention by the Race Relations Law Reporter.
For good discussions of the use of tests of significance with total population data see S. IAPSET,
M. Tlow & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY 480-85 (1956); J. WAHLKE, H. EuL~u, W. BucHANAN
& L. FERGUSON, THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM 455-63 (1962); Selvin, A Critique of Significance in
Survey Research, 22 AM. Socio. REV. 519 (1957).
The data on attorneys general's backgrounds and careers are drawn from a larger study
by the author. Thompson, Steppingstones: An Analysis of the Political Ambitions of State
Attorneys General (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri-Columbia,
1972).
Thompson: Transmission or Resistance: Opinions of State Attorneys General a
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
86 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
The findings presented in this article certainly highlight the
value of pursuing explanations of public policy in the United States
within a framework of impact theory. Such findings are further
proof that the decisions of the Supreme Court are neither automati-
cally obeyed by citizens nor uniformly accepted by governmental
officials. The courts must rely upon others to carry out their man-
dates. Comparative examinations of particular groups of significant
"others" such as state attorneys general can help students of the
judiciary to understand the conditions which facilitate or retard
compliance with court actions. American government is portrayed
to be a "government of laws," not a "government of men." This
portrayal should not be allowed to blind observers from the reality
that human agency is intrinsic in the application of all law. To the
end that such human agency can be better understood, impact
theory can aid in reducing the randomness of such human behavior.
Government can thereby move more closely toward the condition of
uniformity connoted in the concept "government of laws."
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